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I argue that the typical Wittgensteinian method of philosophical investigation cannot help elucidate the 
grammar of aspect-seeing. In the typical Wittgensteinian method, we examine meaning in use: We practice 
language, and note the logical ramifications. I argue that the effectiveness of this method is hindered in the 
case of aspect-seeing by the fact that aspect-seeing involves an aberrant activity of seeing: Whereas it is 
normally nonsense to say that we choose what to see (decide to see the White House red, for instance), it is 
possible to see aspects at will—e.g. to decide to see Jastrow’s duck-rabbit as a duck. I suggest an 
alternative method of investigation, one that reflects on language from a disengaged standpoint: a method 
that allows us to entertain a form of conceptualization of an object but does not commit us to adopting that 
way—namely, that does not involve us in a use of the object according to the norms that govern that 
conceptualization. This method, I argue, fits the subject matter of aspect-perception, since aspect-
perception itself involves such a disengaged form of reflection.  
 
 
And the method has to be somewhat different there. One cannot do so much with 
language games.  





How ought we to investigate the phenomena of aspect-perception? There are many of 
them: a face that suddenly strikes us as familiar but on which we cannot quite put a name, 
an ordinary action that suddenly appears suspicious, Robert Jastrow’s famous duck-
rabbit, , which may appear at first to be a simple rabbit-picture, when it then dawns 
on us that it is also a duck-picture, things—objects, words, texts, people—of which we 
suddenly realize that we have become blind by the routine, a word that suddenly strikes 
us as encapsulating great depths of meaning, a color that strikes us as particularly  
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significant in a Mondrian painting, a musical phrase that strikes us as tragic, a portrait 
that seems as if looking down at us from the wall, and more. Such aspect-experiences are 
typically perceptual experiences, in which an object typically assumes an unexpected 
appearance right before one’s eyes without changing perceptually. When this happens, 
the object is seen—not merely interpreted but literally experienced, perceived—anew.  
 
I shall argue that a special philosophical method is required in order to account for such 
aspect-phenomena. Wittgenstein investigates the phenomena of aspect in §xi of the 
second part of Philosophical Investigations.1 His investigation seems to be an application 
of a familiar Wittgensteinian methodology, which elucidates meaning by examining 
language in use: by operating with the language of aspects and noting how it works in 
practice—the logical and grammatical consequences of conceptualizing things in certain 
ways, when the relevant language is put to use. Although this actually describes a family 
of methods, for expediency, I shall here refer to this method as ‘the typical 
Wittgensteinian method’: the method by which we “bring words back from their 
metaphysical to their everyday use” (PI, §116). I explain in outline how this typical 
method works in §1. This will allow me later to show that this method is unsuitable for 
the task of grammatically clarifying the phenomena of aspects. Although I believe 
Wittgenstein was quite aware of that, I shall not try to show this here. Alternatively, my 
argument will serve to question the assumption that a unified philosophical methodology 
can help with all philosophical problems.2 
 
Here is an outline of the rest of my argument. In §2, I show how the typical method fails 
to elucidate the logical relations between aspect- and ordinary seeing. In §3, I focus on 
one logical characteristic of seeing-aspects—the fact that we can typically see aspects at 
will. I argue that although appreciating this seems, at first, to promise a genuine insight 
into the grammar of ‘seeing-as,’ ultimately it does not really make things clearer: it 
appeals to an aberrant idea of being ‘subject to the will,’ and its usefulness as a clarifying 
tool is thus in question. In §4, I suggest a general characterization of seeing aspects: To 
perceive an aspect, I claim, is to let oneself feel what it would be like to conceptualize 
something without committing oneself to this conceptualization in use. This, I claim, 
involves separation of meaning and use: it involves contemplating the meaning of a 
certain object without using the object in a way that assumes that meaning. Or again, it 
involves applying a concept without at the same time making use of the object 
conceptualized therewith. This separation of meaning and use is the reason why the 
typical Wittgensteinian investigation, which elucidates meaning by investigating 
language in use, fails in the case of aspect-perception. In §5, I conclude by suggesting a 
philosophical method, distinct from the typical Wittgensteinian method, with which we 
can elucidate the grammar of aspect-perception. I argue that the method fit for the job 
itself involves aspect-perception. 
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The discussion of aspects stands at the crossroad of several issues, including: the 
involvement of concepts in perception, their function in moral and aesthetical thought, 
the nature of psychological concepts, of metaphor, of imagery, and the character and uses 
of the imagination in perception and elsewhere. It bears on questions in ethics, the 
philosophy of art, the philosophy of religion, and even in the philosophy of mathematics.3 
Clarity about the philosophical method for investigating the phenomena of aspect will 
contribute to clarity in these areas of philosophy as well. 
 
 
1.  The typical Wittgensteinian method 
 
The task of the typical Wittgensteinian grammatical investigation is to remind us of, 
recall us to, our everyday ways of using language and making sense—our ways of 
owning our world in thought and language, so to speak. To demonstrate, take Plato’s 
Parmenides: Socrates is doing something similar there at one point. Early in the dialogue, 
there is a discussion about multitude and unity, and Socrates distinguishes between 
“visible things” and “things that are grasped by reasoning.”4 A person, for instance—a 
visible thing—can be said to be a multitude and a unity at the same time: a person has 
sides but is a single person. With regard to the concept person however, graspable only 
by reasoning, it would be nonsense to talk about its sides. It cannot therefore be said to be 
a multitude, but only a unity—so, according to Socrates. A general point emerges: we 
may not really need to be able to talk about, make sense of, different kinds of things 
using the very same linguistic machinery—the same concepts, names, methods of 
description and so on. This, although we may think we need that—which probably 
happens more to philosophers who become attached to philosophical dogmas, and 
children who do not master linguistic subtleties. Socrates is here making use of a method 
that Wittgenstein later developed: explaining a piece of language in use; using language, 
letting the logos of things thereby disclose, and thus learning about their essence.5 The 
typical Wittgensteinian investigation, then, is performed with a view to helping someone 
(perhaps oneself) regain linguistic balance—re-establish contact with what one really 
needs to be able to do with language: with the ways in which one talks and thinks—about 
visible things, about concepts—and in general makes sense of things.  
 
Let me emphasize that in the typical Wittgensteinian investigation, the elucidation of bits 
of language—concepts, propositions, names, methods of description, and so on—is 
normally performed by unfolding the logical and grammatical functionality of those bits 
of language. The investigation recalls us to our ordinary ways of making sense by urging 
us to employ them, and thus test their internal logical or grammatical structure. Thus, for 
example, in discussing the language of sensation, Wittgenstein points out that to say that 
my hand hurts is not to say that it is my hand that feels the pain, but me in my hand.6 To 
heed Wittgenstein’s call here is to try and say it: say that your hand, not you, feels the 
pain, and witness how weird it is. The investigation, thus, calls upon us to operate with 
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language—not just reflect on it from a disengaged standpoint, but practice it. And to get a 
clear view of the grammar of sensation, we need to test in a similar fashion many bits of 
sensation-language; for we cannot be sure in advance with regard to any particular piece 
of sensation language that it actually functions in a certain way in a particular case until 
we actually try it and see. 
 
It may seem that an exercise of this method is what is going on in Wittgenstein’s 
discussion of aspects. Avner Baz argues explicitly for this understanding of 
Wittgenstein’s text: “[W]hy” he asks, “should such a work of reminding ourselves of 
something we already know require hundreds of remarks?”7 “How hard” he inquires “can 
accepting the everyday language-game be?”8 It seems reasonable to expect that 
Wittgenstein’s hundreds of painstakingly detailed remarks about every grammatical inch 
in the phenomena of aspect have the same purpose that Wittgensteinian investigations 
typically have: to unfold the grammar of aspect-perception by engaging, participating, in 
the language of aspect-perception—test the grammar of all those aspect-experiences by 
operating with the relevant bits of language: by playing the language-game. The 
investigation, according to this understanding of Wittgenstein’s discussion, reminds us, 
as Baz says, of what is “more or less familiar,”9 what we “already know”10—“what we 
couldn’t have failed to know”11—and yet have got ourselves confused about, like the 
philosopher and the child, under the pressure of some naïve assumption or philosophical 
dogma.  
 
Baz—to my mind one of the best commentators on Wittgenstein on aspects—takes 
aspect-seeing to be part of the everyday language-game with ‘seeing.’ This is telling. 
Rush Rhees seems to have had the opposite inclination. The motto for the present paper is 
the concluding remark Rhees makes in his introduction to Wittgenstein’s Blue and Brown 
Books. Rhees warns against the kind of thing Baz is doing: he warns against assimilating 
Wittgenstein’s discussion of aspect into the pool of typical Wittgensteinian discussions. 
My own view is closer to Rhees’: Baz’s approach to Wittgenstein’s discussion may be 
reasonable, but nevertheless, I shall claim, we have a strong reason to reject it. In the next 
two sections, I will argue that using the typical Wittgensteinian method does not at all 
clarify the grammar of aspect-perception, since these phenomena, by their very nature, 
defy this form of investigation. 
 
 
2.  Seeing and seeing-as 
 
Wittgenstein begins §xi with the presentation of a distinction between ordinary seeing 
and seeing-aspects. These are, he says: 
 
Two uses of the word “see.” 
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The one: “What do you see there?”—“I see this” (and then a description, a 
drawing, a copy). The other: “I see a likeness between these two faces”—
let the man I tell this to be seeing the faces as clearly as I do myself. 
 
Wittgenstein has in mind here the way in which we may examine a face, when suddenly 
its likeness to another dawns on us and alters our experience and our regard to the face—
possibly even to the person. We have here, Wittgenstein thinks, a distinct kind of 
seeing—a distinct meaning of the word ‘see.’ 
 
Like many other words—for instance, ‘bat,’ ‘brown,’ ‘march,’ ‘is’—‘seeing’ is used in 
different ways—logically different ways. But that doesn’t indicate anything problematic. 
To clarify the meaning of ‘seeing’ in the two cases, applying the typical Wittgensteinian 
method, we only need to clarify the relation between the two uses—the two meanings of 
‘see.’ Clarifying this is part of clarifying the grammar of ‘seeing-aspects.’ We could thus 
test the propriety of the typical Wittgensteinian method by trying it out in our case. So, let 
us ask: What is the relation between ordinary- and aspect-seeing? Unlike some of the 
other cases I mentioned, I shall argue, it is by no means clear how to answer this 
question: how to characterize the relations between the two senses of ‘see.’   
 
Let us try: It seems obvious that ordinary- and aspect-seeing are not two completely 
unrelated phenomena, and that ‘seeing’ and ‘aspect-seeing’ are not mere homonyms: The 
case is unlike that of ‘aluminum-bat’ and ‘bat-man,’ for instance, for the two kinds of 
seeing are internally related; they are kinds of the same thing: seeing. In order to 
characterize the grammar of aspect-seeing, we need to characterize its internal relations 
to ordinary seeing. The idea that ‘seeing’ and ‘seeing-aspects’ are mere homonyms is 
thus rejected.  
 
There are many types of internal relations between concepts, but two in particular suggest 
themselves in our case. First, it may be that the relation between ordinary- and aspect-
seeing is that between two applications of the same concept in different contexts—like 
‘feed the meter’ and ‘feed the monkey,’12 or ‘cut the grass’ and ‘cut the cake.’ Another 
possibility is that ordinary- and aspect-seeing relate to each other as genus to species, 
where aspect-seeing is a species of the genus seeing. Our question, then, is: Does any of 
these suggestions, however intuitive, actually adequately capture the relationship between 
ordinary- and aspect-seeing? I think not. 
 
The relation between ordinary- and aspect-seeing is unlike other cases of applying the 
same concept in different contexts, for unlike those other cases, the relation between 
ordinary- and aspect-seeing is asymmetrical: the meaning of ‘seeing’ when applied to 
aspects depends on, cannot be understood independently of, the meaning of ordinary 
seeing, but not vice versa. Such asymmetrical dependency does not exist in the cases of 
‘feed’ and ‘cut’: the notions of cutting grass and of cutting cakes are both equally useful, 
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for instance, in teaching a child the meaning of ‘cut.’ But when we teach a child the 
meaning of ‘see,’ we cannot use aspect-seeing as our example. The child will only be 
able to understand talk of seeing aspects if she has already mastered the concept(s) of 
ordinary-seeing. We can understand what someone is getting at when they talk of seeing 
the duck-aspect in Jastrow’s duck-rabbit only if we already know what it means for 
people to see ducks, whereas we do not need to first master the concept of cutting grass in 
order to then be in a position to master the concept of cutting cakes or vice versa.13  The 
cases, therefore, are really very different. Although we may talk of the relation between 
ordinary- and aspect-seeing as a relation between different applications of the same 
concept, it is not yet very helpful, for it fails to capture the particular shape the internal 
relation takes in this case: it fails to capture the peculiarity of the dependency here.14 
 
Since, as we just saw, what constitutes the internal relation between aspect-seeing and 
seeing is an asymmetrical dependence of aspect- on ordinary-seeing, we might opt for the 
suggestion that what we really have here is a relation between genus and species. But that 
will not do either. For saying that aspect-seeing is a species of ordinary-seeing implies 
that seeing a duck-aspect, for instance, is a species of seeing a duck—which is obviously 
false. Seeing an aspect, although related, is a different experience than simply seeing a 
familiar object; the former is not a species of the latter. And saying that both are species 
of a common genus—seeing—just sends us back to the same kind of problem discussed 
in the paragraph above—of explaining how it is possible for there to be an asymmetrical 
logical dependence between two species of the same genus: how is it possible that we can 
understand what it is to see an aspect only if we already understand what it is to see 
ordinary objects.15 We still haven’t got a grasp on the kind of dependence we find 
between aspect- and ordinary-seeing. 
 
What we need is to answer the following question: How can there be dependence 
between two different kinds of application of the same word in the way aspect-seeing 
depends on ordinary-seeing? One thing is clear: we need this term—‘see’—here.16 The 
only word that can properly describe, say, our experience of the duck-aspect of Jastrow’s 
duck-rabbit is ‘seeing.’ But since the logical relation of aspect-seeing and ordinary-seeing 
does not take any ordinary shape, one may begin to suspect that what leads us to use the 
word ‘seeing’ in characterizing experiences of aspects is not something in the logic of 
aspect-experiences, but rather some psychological inclination: e.g. the psychological 
associations to the idea of seeing that such experiences tend to elicit in us. There seem to 
be nothing in the logic, the grammar, of the experience that really justifies calling it a 
case of seeing; or if there is, we have not got it clear to ourselves yet. So far, the 
dependence between aspect- and ordinary seeing seems to be psychological, not logical.  
 
Now, I haven’t yet shown that this is indeed the case. But if it turns out that it is, it has 
important implications: Primarily, it would render the typical Wittgensteinian method 
helpless; for it is a method that looks for meaning in significant use—in practice. It is a 
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method faithful to the Fregean principle: “always to separate sharply the psychological 
from the logical, the subjective from the objective.”17 If the meaning of ‘see’ when 
applied to aspects is indeed not something we can discern in how the word is used, then 
we must look for it elsewhere; perhaps we should somehow read it off of our 
psychological associations between the experience of aspects and the ordinary cases of 
seeing. The typical Wittgensteinian method, which looks for meaning in use, and not in 
the psychological associations elicited by the term, seems ill equipped for this job. 
 
 
3.  Seeing at will 
 
Perhaps, one may argue, my approach so far has been too direct. Perhaps, instead of 
attempting to clarify the grammar of ‘seeing-aspects’ as a whole, we should study the 
language game by studying its logical components—its logical makeup. Let us then 
examine some of the logical characteristics of the concept. Maybe we can build up from 
there.  
 
The typical Wittgensteinian investigation proceeds by highlighting grammatical 
differences between uses of a term—in our case, ‘see.’ So let me highlight two logical 
differences between seeing and seeing an aspect. First, in the language game with 
ordinary seeing there is normally no room for saying that we see the same thing, and at 
the same time that we see something different. Typically, for instance, we can exchange 
‘I see the same zebra’ for ‘I do not see a different zebra.’ When seeing an aspect, 
however, we want to say both “that nothing, and yet everything, has changed” (RPP2, 
§474). Take, for instance, Wittgenstein’s example of the similar faces. What we see 
before and after the similarity between the two faces has dawned on us is the same. But at 
the same time, we also see something different. Since this has been the subject of some 
controversy, let me emphasize that I do not take this to constitute a paradox. My only 
claim here is that there is a logical-grammatical difference between ordinary- and aspect-
seeing.18 The second logical difference I would like to mention—and on which I further 
elaborate below—is that normally we do not take it to be possible to see at will. For 
instance, we cannot at will see the White House red (nor white, for that matter). In the 
case of aspect-seeing, we can see things at will. We can see, for instance,  either as a 
duck or as a rabbit, and once we learn how, this depends on us (see RPPI, §976).19 
 
It would seem that we are making progress—that we are elucidating, making clear, at 
least parts of the grammar of ‘seeing-aspects.’ But take this idea that the perception of 
aspects is subject to the will. Compare this to other cases where we say that something is 
subject to the will, say, that what I am going to have for dinner today is subject to my 
will. Seeing aspects does not seem to be subject to the will in the same way—the same 
sense—as what I have for dinner is; and this is why: Typically, there is a contrast 
between something being forced on us and something being subject to our will. This is, 
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anyway, typically the case with what I have for dinner. If what I have for dinner is 
subject to my will, then it is not forced on me, and vice versa. This does not mean that it 
is always easy to say whether I am forced or not, or whether my choice has or has not 
been subject to my will. But the contrast is there in the grammar of the action; it makes 
sense to ask: “Did you have raw cabbage for dinner because this is what you wanted, or 
were you forced to have it?” When it comes to seeing aspects, however, the grammatical 
room for the same kind of contrast is gone. When an aspect dawns on us—when the 
similarity between two faces suddenly strikes us, for example—something is forced on 
us, hits us; and yet, what is forced on us is an actualization of a capacity whose exercise 
is typically willful: the capacity to make sense, to contemplate, to engage our cognitive 
and imaginative abilities in the capturing of something in thought. When an aspect dawns 
on us, we are forced to participate—participate willingly. We find ourselves acting, but 
unlike the typical case, that we find ourselves doing something does not indicate that we 
do not act intentionally.20 In fact, the only way to describe what happens is to say that we 
find ourselves acting intentionally, forced to act willfully. And it can—and sometimes 
does—seem like an invasion.21 This, in somewhat like the way I can force you to imagine 
the Eifel Tower. If you have been paying attention, I have just forced it on you—I have, 
as it were, forced you to do something willingly: to think, to imagine.22 Similarly, when 
you suddenly see the duck in , or when you suddenly see the resemblance between 
two faces, it is at the same time something that you undergo and something that you do. It 
would be natural for you to exclaim: “I didn’t know I could do that!” This is part of the 
surprise: that it is we who have “brought a concept to [what we see]” (RPPI, §961).23 
When seeing becomes subject to the will, then, the distinction between subject to will and 
compulsory is blurred; the grammar of ‘subject to the will’ changes.  
 
If I am right, then it is not at all clear that by continuing to apply the typical method, and 
saying that aspect-seeing is, and ordinary-seeing is not, subject to the will, we are moving 
towards greater clarity of what aspect seeing is, and of the grammar of ‘seeing-aspects.’ 
For it is not clear yet that we have a good grasp of the idea that seeing can be subject to 
the will. We can attempt to clarify that by characterizing the relations between ‘subject to 
the will’ in ordinary cases, and ‘subject to the will’ when applied to seeing. But if you do 
that, you will discover that it is not any easier to describe than the relation between the 
two uses of ‘see’ (see §2 above): the two are not mere homonyms, but it will also not do 
to characterize the relations between them as that between two applications of the same 
concept in different contexts, or as between genus and species. The sense of ‘subject to 
the will’ when applied to seeing depends on, derives from, its sense in ordinary cases, but 
not vice versa—just as the meaning of ‘seeing aspects’ depends on the meaning of 
‘seeing’ in ordinary cases. But it is not as if we should (or could) speak otherwise: We 
need these terms here—‘see,’ and ‘subject to the will.’  It seems that we need the same 
logical entity to function in logically different ways. And if that is the case, then, once 
more, the relationship—the logical dependence—cannot be captured with the typical 
Wittgensteinian method that looks for meaning in use and not, for instance, in the 
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psychological associations of a term. The problem of elucidating the grammar of ‘aspect-
seeing’ seems to have spread out: It has infected other areas of the language game. The 
game seems to be losing its rules; it is not clearly a game anymore. It does not seem we 
are moving in a useful direction after all.  
 
 
4.  Watching the language game from the sidelines 
 
We need a fresh start. My considerations so far raise worries about the aptness of the 
typical Wittgensteinian method of investigation in the case of the phenomena of aspect. I 
am not saying that this method is never useful; very often it is. It is just not useful when 
trying to clarify the grammar of aspect-perception. And if this is right, then we can learn 
here a general lesson about philosophical methods: it is misguided to look for a single 
philosophical method that could solve all philosophical questions. More specifically, 
what I called ‘the typical Wittgensteinian method’ (itself, recall, a multitude of methods) 
is not what will help us clarify philosophical questions that involve aspect phenomena. 
And since such questions can arguably be found in the philosophy of religion, ethics, 
aesthetics, and even in the philosophy of mathematics, then possibly, in these areas, we 
may sometimes need to apply other philosophical methods.  
 
Now, the reason why the typical Wittgensteinian method is not useful for the clarification 
of aspect-perception, is, I believe, that these phenomena involve—essentially—a 
separation of meaning and use: To describe these phenomena, as we have seen, we are 
drawn to say that we need the same logical entities to function in logically different ways. 
And I now want to argue that this is not confusion on our part; we do not have a better 
way of putting it. But if this is true, then it undermines—undercuts really—the usefulness 
of investigating the language of aspects by examining functionality. To employ the 
typical Wittgensteinian method is, once more, to investigate language in use; to examine 
grammar by applying language, operating with it, and thereby discovering how it works 
in practice—how it allows us to think, capture reality in thought, and make sense of 
things. The typical method is useful and very much effective when there is (and very 
often there is) an established use, established logical-grammatical norms for the 
application of terms. It is useful for unveiling these usages and norms. But when meaning 
is detached from use, as in the case of aspect-perception, then use cannot any longer be a 
safe guide. 
 
Interestingly, according to Wittgenstein, this separation of meaning and use is typical to 
aspect-perception:  
 
I take it as the typical game of “seeing something as something”, when 
someone says “Now I see it as this, now as that” […] and that 
independently of his making any application of what he sees. (RPP1 §411) 




However confused that separation of meaning and use might seem, this is what happens 
in those cases. The “grammar” of this “language-game” is not just different: it is of a 
different kind, and we need a different method for clarifying it. But before describing that 
different method, which I will take up in §5, I would like now to offer a characterization 
of the phenomena of aspect which is of a different sort than the characterizations I have 
so far examined: a characterization not of the details of their grammar, but of their point 
as a whole. When an aspect dawns, I shall argue, we see something anew. In this sense, to 
see an aspect is to see something we did not already know we could see: to contemplate 
(albeit in palpable, possibly perceptual, experience) a new way of thinking about 
something. I thus put aside for the moment the question of philosophical method, and 
shall get back to it in §5, once we have a clearer understanding of the phenomena of 
aspect-perception. 
 
Think of the moment in which an aspect dawns. It is typically as if the object we are 
observing is being filled with a new life, or as if we come into new life with it. It is 
animated, or reanimated, and I suggest that this animation is essentially animation by 
language: A concept (or notion, or idea) “spreads an ordering veil over the object” (RPP1 
§961). So, for example, when the duck aspect of  dawns on us, it is as if the concept 
duck entered the ink-marks, and made them into a duck-picture. Or when a portrait on the 
wall suddenly seems as if it is watching us, it is as if the idea that it has a mind has 
awakened a person in the canvas, and now the portrait has a mind. In both cases, the 
object is being imbued with a body of meaning that was not there before. 
 
Now, even though a body of meaning has made contact with it, the object in aspect-
perception is not thereby put to use. The dawning of the aspect is a preamble to such use. 
When an aspect dawns, one is letting oneself feel how it would be to conceptualize an 
object—how it would be to use it accordingly—but is not yet committed to its 
conceptualization. One is not operating with the object in a way that assumes this 
conceptualization. 
 
To clarify this, compare the use of concepts in aspect seeing to the use of concepts in 
other activities: for instance, in drawing a logical conclusion, or in identifying your coat 
on the hanger, or in using your toothbrush to brush your teeth. In all of those cases, the 
concept functions in regulating an activity—the activity of drawing a logical conclusion, 
or of identifying a coat, or of brushing teeth.24 Or again, in those cases, the application of 
the concept is an engagement in a practice that is regulated by it. We may, for instance, 
describe a person who is using a hammer to drive a nail into the wall as thereby using the 
concept hammer. This concept regulates her activity: she hammers. Her use of the 
hammer is at the same time an application of that concept. Or from the other direction, 
the application of a concept takes the form of using an object in a way that assumes that 
conceptualization of it.  




In this sense, to have a concept is to have the ability to do something: to capture 
something in thought and to act in a way that is norm-regulated.25 Having a concept is 
manifested—typically—in the engagement in a relevant sort of activity: e.g. hammering 
nails in the case of the concept hammer, but also, for instance, in the ability to identify 
hammers, recommend the use of a hammer in the right circumstances, and explain how to 
be careful when using a hammer.  
 
As opposed to that, the application of a concept in the case of aspect-seeing does not take 
the form of operating with the object. Rather, we can say that a concept is used merely to 
entertain its meaning, without putting it to work. This involves bringing the concept to 
the object, letting oneself feel what it would be like to conceptualize the object with this 
concept, but without committing oneself: without thereby making use of the object in the 
relevant way.26 It is in this sense that we can say that in aspect-perception meaning is 
separated from use. Or better: to perceive an aspect is to entertain meaning independently 
of use. To see an aspect in an object, then, is not to operate with the object accordingly. 
Seeing the similarity between two faces, for instance, is not using a picture of the one to 
identify the other, and seeing the duck aspect in  is not using it as a duck-picture in a 
children’s book. Similarly, being struck by how familiar a face looks is not recognizing 
it, and hearing a musical phrase as tragic is not having a reason to feel sorrow. 
 
I am suggesting, then, a distinction between seeing an aspect in something and using it in 
the relevant way: a difference between seeing an aspect in something on the one hand, 
and on the other hand judging that it falls under a concept, or using it in a way that 
assumes such judgment. Seeing an aspect, I suggest, is bringing a concept to the object 
without using the object in a way that demonstrates an endorsement of the judgment that 
it falls under that concept.27 Aspect-seeing is therefore different from recognizing, 
identifying, or realizing something. This is not to say that these are not 
phenomenologically similar to aspect-perception. They are: like the experience of an 
aspect, recognizing, identifying, and realizing may all involve “A-ha!” moments. Unlike 
aspect-perception, however, they involve making conceptual judgments. To recognize the 
symptoms of Malaria, for instance, is to judge that one is examining a person sick with 
Malaria. Aspect-perception, on the other hand, only involves entertaining the possibility 
of conceptualizing the object in a certain way, but without committing to it in using the 
object accordingly.28  
 
Metaphorically, to perceive an aspect is to stand on the sidelines of language: not quite 
outside, but not inside either; it is to entertain the language game without participating in 
it. There is, then, a connection between seeing an aspect in something and using it 
accordingly—a connection despite the distinction I am urging. For seeing an aspect—e.g. 
seeing  as a mountain, or hearing one musical phrase as a question answered by 
another phrase—is related to the relevant linguistic capacities: mastery of the concepts of 
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mountain and of asking and answering a question. In fact, it logically depends on mastery 
of those capacities: It is logically impossible to be struck by those aspects, if one does not 
have the relevant concepts. Or again, it is impossible to see the duck aspect of , if you 
do not have the concept duck: if you cannot, for instance, already identify certain things 
you see as ducks.  
 
In general, then, we may describe the relationship between the application of concepts in 
aspect-seeing and in operating with objects by saying the following: In both cases, one is 
contemplating the meaning of the same thing: the object, the word, the picture, or 
whatever. One is also contemplating the same concept. The difference is that in the two 
cases this is done from two different standpoints: When looking at something in the 
course of using it, we are looking at it “from within”: that is, we are using it, applying it, 
according to some norms, treating it as a certain kind of object, and are thus engaged with 
the norms for its usage. The cogwheels of our mind, as it were, are engaged with those 
norms—turned by them. When seeing an aspect, on the other hand, we are looking at 
something “from sideways-on”:29 we are disengaged from, and uncommitted to, the 
norms of its usage. When seeing an aspect in something—in that short moment—a way 
of capturing it in thought is in view, and still we are not (at least not yet) practicing it. We 
may talk here of looking at something sub specie aeternitatis: from the point of view of 
eternity.30  
 
To sum up, to perceive an aspect is essentially to reflect upon language from a 
disengaged standpoint. It is to let oneself feel the good of having a piece of linguistic 
machinery—a concept—without committing oneself to it in practice. It is to view the 
language game without participating in it. This gives aspect-perception peculiar 
characteristics, as we have seen, some of which may seem to violate or at least challenge 
our conception of the very nature of linguistic activity. In particular, aspect-perception 
frustrates the Wittgensteinian philosophical instinct, namely to expect that use will be a 
safe guide to meaning, and it strips the typical Wittgensteinian method of its powers. To 
clarify the grammar of aspect-perception we therefore need a different method, which is 
what I turn to now. 
 
 
5.  Aspect seeing as a philosophical method 
 
Elucidation of meanings, in the typical Wittgensteinian investigation, is the elucidation of 
them as logical entities, performed by practicing them and thus unfolding their logical 
and grammatical functionality. But if that is so, what are we to do when the same logical 
entity starts behaving in logically different ways? What should we do when the activity of 
seeing, for instance, about which it used to be nonsensical to say that it could be done at 
will, starts behaving as if it can be done at will? What should we do when a concept see, 
which used to be the kind of thing that was essentially embedded in certain functionality, 
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starts behaving as an independent body of meaning? How can we recall ourselves to our 
ordinary ways of making sense of things in those cases, when operating with them is no 
longer a safe guide to their meaning? A metaphilosophical discussion, a discussion about 
philosophical method, is forced on us by the phenomena of aspect. Hopefully, as Stephen 
Mulhall promised, these phenomena will cast “a new light on what is involved in 
understanding the grammar of words.”31  
 
When we are perceiving aspects, I have been suggesting, we are reflecting on language 
from a disengaged standpoint. Meaning is contemplated, but in an uncommitted manner. 
What we are investigating, we may say, is that part of our linguistic practical life in 
which we transcend it to a reflective and disengaged standpoint. And my claim in what 
follows is that in order to investigate this transcendence, we need to engage in a form of 
investigation, a method, that itself involves a similar transcendence. The method for the 
investigation of the phenomena of aspect requires the form of its subject matter: it itself 
requires searching for aspects. 
 
When I described in §§2-3 parts of the grammar of aspect-perception, I came across 
difficulties and anomalies. I argued, for instance, that we need a way to express the idea 
that aspect-perception is subject to the will—that we can see  as a duck at will, for 
example—and yet, I claimed, when we try to describe what ‘subjet to the will’ means in 
this case, we find that it does not quite mean what it meant in ordinary cases. The 
meaning of ‘aspect-seeing’ is then elucidated by appeal to a logically rogue idea of being 
subject to the will; and one possible reaction to this is to say that, after all, by saying that 
aspect-seeing is subject to the will, we have not really elucidated the meaning of ‘aspects-
seeing,’ but only made things murkier. This is a possible reaction. But perhaps it is not 
necessary to adopt it. Perhaps it is even mistaken. That is, perhaps we may miss 
something important if we adopt it: for we really need the idea of ‘subject to the will’ 
here. The activity, aspect-seeing, has that aspect. Rogue as it might be, it did not come to 
us on a whim. “And if this sounds crazy, you need to reflect that the concept of seeing is 
modified here” (PI, 209). 
 
Another possible reaction—the one I am recommending—is to say that this is what 
elucidation comes to in this case: this is the proper philosophical method. It is not a 
coincidence that in clarifying the grammar of aspect-seeing, we need to use an aberant 
idea of being subject to the will. But we are not thereby identifying an normative element 
of the application of that concept—we are not characterizing a part of its routine 
grammar. Rather, we identify an aspect. And we really do see a “subject-to-the-will” 
aspect in the activity of aspect-seeing. Using Stanley Cavell’s words, we are here 
“exploring a state of mind whose balance is threatened by the […] perception that 
rationality has come to express irrationality.”32 The whole investigation reeks of 
paradoxality.33 Things really do sound crazy. Merely in order to describe the phenomena 
of aspect and the grammar of ‘seeing-as,’ just to characterize a particular aspect-
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experience, one is constantly called upon to use pieces of language—terms and 
expressions borrowed from ordinary language—but only call upon them insofar as they 
have the right feel. That is, in characterizing an experience of aspect by saying, for 
instance, that it is subject to the will, we do not mean to bring all the normative baggage 
of the concept subject to will. We only appeal to it in a way that allows us to feel what it 
would require to properly conceptualize this experience.  
 
Although we recognize that ‘subject to the will’ means something different when applied 
to this experience, we still have to use this term. We need this term here. And this, I 
suggest, in exactly the same way that, when describing the portrait on the wall looking at 
us, we need the idea that it has a mind. In general, when applied to such phenomena, the 
concepts with which we describe the phenomena do not function in the way they do 
ordinarily. They allow us to characterize the phenomena, but do not commit us to a full 
blown application of the norms related to those concepts. This uncommittedness naturally 
creates anomalies. But this, I suggest, characterizes the investigation of aspect-
perception; it characterizes, that is, what is necessary for a proper investigation of these 
phenomena. Metaphorically, we can say that in order to investigate what is on the 
sidelines of the language game, we need to stand there ourselves. In order to examine 
what happens when the connection between meaning and use is suspended, we must 
ourselves remain suspended in our mode of investigation. The seeing of aspects, in other 
words, is an essential part of the proper philosophical method for the investigation of 
aspects. 
 
If what I have been claiming is right, the investigation of aspects does not need to be very 
different from what we have been doing after all—what I did in §§2-3, for instance. Only 
that we do not need to be surprised or dismayed when we find that the language we are 
using in the investigation is logically slanted, or aberrant. We should search for such 
shifts in application, and expect that the clarification of these shifts will themselves 
necessitate further such shifts. We should trace these shifts wherever they lead us. And 
my point now is that this very activity of tracing grammatical shifts characterizes the 
required philosophical activity, the necessary mode of investigation in the case of aspect-
perception. This is the proper philosophical method here. Tracing such shifts of 
application is standing on the sidelines of language. To trace these shifts when clarifying 
the phenomena of aspect is to occupy a disengaged suspended standpoint, and 
contemplate meanings without being committed to them in practice: It is to allow oneself 
to call upon terms that one needs in the characterization of the language of aspects, but 
independently of the routine usage of those terms. It is to allow oneself, for instance, to 
call upon the expression ‘subject to the will,’ even though its application is not even 
meant to be a typical one; call upon it just because it—and it only—has the right feel.  
 
Now, if this requires that we bite logical bullets, then so be it, for biting logical bullets is 
of the essence of investigating the grammar of aspect phenomena. Call it biting a logical 
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bullet, or exploring a different kind of logical structure—it does not much matter. What 
matters—and this is what I would like to emphasize about the point of the language of 
aspects—is that moving away from the kind of logic in which meaning is tied to use is 
what we intend to do anyhow when experiencing and describing aspect experiences. The 
whole point of the investigation, its interest, is reflecting on meanings independently of, 
and uncommitted to, the ordinary employment of conceptual norms. This is especially 
clear in cases such as experiencing an object—a car, say—as having a personality. One 
does not thereby make a conceptual judgment. One does not even intend to. One does 
not, for instance, think that such experience justifies psychological research of cars. The 
point is rather to bring a concept to the object and let oneself feel what it would be like to 
conceptualize the object with this concept. The “language game” of aspects, its point, is 
to go beyond the guidance of grammar. 
 
The point of the language of aspects, then, is the contemplation of meaning 
independently of use. In investigating these phenomena, we must therefore already be 
using our imagination in a particular—peculiar—way.34 And if I am right about that, then 
in investigating the phenomena of aspect, one needs to use language in ways one did not 
already know it can be used. I am here taking a position contrary to that of Avner Baz 
(see §1). Baz argues that the Wittgensteinian investigation of the language of aspects 
reminds us of what we “already know.” If I am right, however, when investigating the 
language of aspects, one is constantly called upon to use language in ways one did not 
know it can be used. And that one did not know that language can be so used is essential: 
for one is called upon to contemplate the meaning of terms in abstraction from their use. 
The language of aspect calls upon us to investigate imaginatively. 
 
In objection to what I have been claiming, one may insist that talk of seeing aspects 
cannot be as logically aberrant as I am suggesting. Even granting that we sometimes 
express ourselves in strange ways when we give expression to aspect-experiences—for 
instance, that the skies looks sad, or that the portrait is looking down on us from the 
wall—even granting that, nothing can be less weird than calling seeing aspect a case of 
seeing, and less strange than saying that it is subject to the will. The sad skies and the 
portrait examples may indeed seem to be obviously, and purposefully categorically 
mistaken, and in general baffling (although, if you “get” the intention, they may at the 
same time seem oddly proper), but not so calling aspect-seeing “seeing,” or saying that it 
is subject to the will. It does not seem to be our intention to say something categorically 
mistaken when we say these things.  
 
I agree: it is usually not our intention to say something logically weird when we talk of 
“seeing” aspects and of it being “subject to the will.” Nevertheless, I maintain we come 
up in those cases with logically slanted expressions, even when we do not want to or even 
notice. Such things sometimes happen to us. It does not always seem to us to be 
essential—and we do not always want it to be essential to our intention—that what we 
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experience is logically odd (can only be expressed using logically skewed language). 
Indeed, this is often the case with seeing aspects. Thus, one may not intend to say 
something weird when one says that they can see at will, or that nothing and yet 
everything has changed—it is the most natural thing to say; the only thing to say. But the 
aberrant logical intention is nevertheless forced on one in this case. And this characterizes 
what we will inevitably find ourselves doing—if we are properly reflective—when we 
investigate aspect-perception. Frustrated at our inability to capture the idea in a logically 
“clean” way, we may wish to resist and deny it. But there is no other way to express 
ourselves. The intention to say something that is grammatically “off” is, as it were, forced 
on us.  
 
My point is also metaphilosophical: to clarify the phenomena and language of aspects 
requires willingness to be implicated in the logical oddness of these phenomena. “Like 
Freud’s therapy,” writes Stanley Cavell, “[Wittgenstein’s writing] wishes to prevent 
understanding which is unaccompanied by inner change.”35 What I hope to have 
achieved in this last section is also a better appreciation of what it takes to let the forces 
of change in Wittgenstein’s writing run deep enough.36 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
1 The texts of Wittgenstein’s I shall refer to are:  
   TLP –Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Ogden, C. K.  (trans.), London: Routledge, 1922. 
   PI – Philosophical Investigations, 3rd edition, Rhees, R. and Anscombe, G. E. M. (eds.),        Anscombe 
G. E. M. (trans.), Oxford: Blackwell, 1958. 
   BB – The Blue and Brown Books, 2nd edition, Oxford: Blackwell, 1969.  
   RPP1 – Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Anscombe G. E. M. and von Wright      G. H. 
(eds.), Anscombe G. E. M. (trans.), Oxford: Blackwell, 1980. 
   RPP2 –Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 2, von Wright G. H. and Nyman H.      (eds.), 
Luckhardt C. G. and Aue M. A. E. (trans.), Oxford: Blackwell, 1980. 
   CV –Culture and Value, von Wright G. H., Nyman H. and Pichler A. (eds.), Winch P. (trans.), 
     Oxford: Blackwell, 1998. 
 
2 In the same vein, Wittgenstein claims: “There is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed 
methods, like different therapies” (PI, §133). This, placed alongside other things he says about 
philosophical methodology, may still leave the impression that those different methods are yet unified by 
some shared principle or character or point. My argument, if successful, would allow us to see how deep 
the differences might be between those methods. 
 
3 For discussions of the phenomena of aspect in connection with the philosophy of mathematics see Cora 
Diamond, “The Face of Necessity,” The Realistic Spirit, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT, 1991, 243-66; Juliet 
Floyd, “On Being Surprised: Wittgenstein on Aspect-Perception, Logic, and Mathematics,” in: Seeing 
Wittgenstein Anew, Day W. and Krebs V. J. (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, 314-
337.  
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5 “Essence is expressed by grammar” (PI, §371). 
 
6 See PI, §286. 
 
7 “On Learning from Wittgenstein, or What Does it Take to See the Grammar of Seeing Aspects?” Seeing 
Wittgenstein Anew, Day W. and Krebs V. J. (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, 227-
48—hereafter LFW—235; my italics. 
 
8 Ibid; my italic.  
 
9 LFW, 234 
 
10 LFW, 235 
 
11 LFW, 237 
 
12 It is possible that we will not understand the reason for calling feeding meters ‘feeding’ in the first place, 
if we don’t think of it in the light of feeding monkeys or babies or cows. For someone who does not see the 
point of talking of ‘feeding’ in the case of meters, the two words are mere homonyms. 
 
13 I am not denying that there might be dependence between the different uses of ‘cut’ and ‘feed’. But to the 
extent that there is, it is unlike the dependence of aspect-seeing on ordinary-seeing. 
 
14 There is an additional caveat. My claim in general is that when we have two applications of same concept 
in different contexts, we don’t have to learn one first in order to learn the other. It may be argued, however, 
that not all applications of a concept in different contexts are, as it were, on the same level. My general 
claim, it may be said, may be plausible for cases like the application of ‘feed’ to horses, babies, and cows—
applications that are on the same level. But when it comes to feeing meters, for instance, the story is 
different: We first need to learn the application of ‘feed’ to cows and horses, and only then we will be able 
to learn the application of ‘feed’ to meters. This may apply to other figurative applications of concepts. The 
objection then may be that something like this may very well characterize the relations between ordinary- 
and aspect-seeing. However—and this is my response—this suggestion is false: It may indeed be that we 
will not see the point of calling feeding meters ‘feeding’; but we can see the point of feeding meters even if 
we don’t see the point of calling it that. We can identify the activity of feeding meters independently of that 
of feeding cows, and we can describe it in terms that are independent. It is in this sense that we can learn to 
apply ‘feeding’ to meters without first learning its application to cows. If there is a dependence of ‘feeding-
meters’ on ‘feeding-cows’—and I do not mean to deny that in some sense there is—it is not of the same 
sort that exists between ‘aspect-seeing’ and ‘ordinary-seeing.’ In the latter case, we will not only be unable 
to see the point of applying ‘seeing’ to aspects, we cannot describe or identify the activity of aspect-seeing 
independently of that of ordinary seeing—without appeal to the concept seeing. 
 
15 Anton Ford makes a distinction between three forms of generality, three forms that the relationship 
between genus and species might take: accidental, categorial, and essential. (“Action and Generality,” in 
Essays on Anscombe’s Intention, A. Ford, J. Hornsby, F. Stoutland (eds.), Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
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University Press, 2011, 76-104.) I submit that the relationship between ordinary- and aspect-seeing does 
not take any of those forms. It may be tempting to think that their relationship is one that involves what 
Ford calls essential generality, which is characterized by a kind of asymmetry: aspect-seeing relates to 
ordinary-seeing as unessential to essential species—like impure to pure gold—where the essential species 
is logically prior to other species of the same genus in that those other species involve a privation. 
However, although ordinary-seeing is indeed the more basic concept, aspect-seeing is not a privation of 
seeing: It is not seeing that falls short of some standard. 
 
16 Compare what Wittgenstein says about “Wednesday is fat” in PI, 216. Though I will not defend this 
claim here, I take ‘aspect-seeing’ to be a secondary use of ‘seeing’—use of ‘seeing’ in a secondary sense. 
 
17 Gottlob Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetic, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1950, x. 
 
18 It is however true that the logical differences between ordinary- and aspect-seeing, together with the 
peculiar logical relationship between the two, give this discussion an air of paradoxality. I discuss this 
further below. For the different sides in the controversy see the exchange between Stephen Mulhall and 
Avner Baz. By Mulhall: Inheritance and Originality, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001 (hereafter IO), 
and “The Work of Wittgenstein’s Words: A Reply to Baz, Seeing Wittgenstein Anew, Day W. and Krebs V. 
J. (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, 249-67. By Baz: “What’s the Point of Seeing 
Aspects?” Philosophical Investigations, vol. 23(2), 2000, 97-121 (hereafter PSA); and LFW. My 
understanding of the phenomena of aspect is much indebted to Mulhall’s and Baz’s, and this paper is fueled 
by their disagreements.  
 
19 There is a sense in which seeing likeness is also subject to the will: that in which it makes sense to say 
that one is trying to see the similarity. I discuss this issue further below. 
The difference between ordinary seeing and seeing aspects can also be seen in a third element: In many 
cases of aspect-perception, “the expression of the seeing of an aspect,” as Baz says, “is an Äusserung” 
(PSA, 106)—an expression. Wittgenstein makes a distinction between expression and description, where to 
describe something in a certain way is the manifestation of interpreting it accordingly, whereas to give 
expression to a sense impression, for instance, is not.  Usually, that is, we can make a distinction between 
two functions that an utterance might have: an Äusserung and a description. In the case of aspect-
experiences, however, the grammatical-logical line between expression and description becomes blurred: it 
is not so much that the same utterance has both functions; rather, the functions themselves are somehow 
intermingled: One can express oneself, as it were, only via a description. For instance, “The two faces have 
the same look!” is an Äusserung; but it has the outward grammar of description, and there is no way of 
making it take the grammatical form of an expression. As Wittgenstein puts this point: “an interpretation 
becomes an expression of experience. And the interpretation is not an indirect description; no, it is the 
primary expression of the experience” (RPP1 §20). 
 
20 See BB, 152-3. 
 
21 This, especially when one wants to resist a way of seeing something. The point may also be useful in the 
discussion of revelations—religious and otherwise. Revelation does not only bring something new to your 
attention; it rather makes you participate in the experience, it activates you and forces you to take part in 
your own transformation. 
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22 Wittgenstein connects having mental images to seeing aspects in several places. My sense is that the 
connection is far reaching, and requires a lengthy separate discussion.  
 
23 Similarly, Avner Baz says: “It [the aspect] appears over there, in the object, and yet we know we must 
have had something to do with that appearance. We know that, not so much because we have made a 
conscious effort to bring it about, typically we make no such effort, but because we know that nothing other 
than ourselves could have been the cause of that appearance” (PSA, 110). “It is this peculiarity of the 
aspect—its being something that fits the object, and at the same time something that we bring to the object; 
its being a way of seeing something anew while remaining faithful to it—that gives expressing it its point 
in ordinary contexts” (PSA, 111). 
 
24 in TLP §3.326, Wittgenstein calls such an activity “the significant use.” It is the practical-logical context 
in which a signs gets to function and thereby becomes a symbol. 
 
25 There are things which having a concept allows us to do, which are external to having the concept. In 
such cases, concepts are available independently of what we can do with them, and we choose certain 
concepts and not others because the former fulfill some needs that the latter do not. However, having a 
concept is primarily tied to the things it allows us to do that are internal to having it. To have a concept, in 
this sense, just is to master some technique: to be able to do certain things. With regard to those internal 
things, therefore, it makes no sense to talk of having a concept without being able to do those things. In this 
sense, concepts and what we do with them are not given independently.  
 
26 I should note that not all cases in which we see something and are not using it in the relevant way are 
cases of aspect-perception. When, for instance, we look at someone familiar without recognizing her, or 
when we look at  and see nothing but a line and a dot (try looking at it upside down), we are obviously 
also seeing a familiar face or a picture-duck, but not engaging them as such. In such cases what we see is 
not alive for us. But we also don’t see the point of it becoming alive; it is just, at least on some level, “a 
bundle of perceptions.” As opposed to that, when an aspect dawns—when one looks in the mirror and 
suddenly sees one’s father, for instance, or when one has milk and cookies and it suddenly tastes like 
childhood—in such cases something comes to life, or at least comes to have new life, even though it is not 
put to use accordingly. In fact, it is sometimes not even clear what the relevant application would be like. 
We have a pretty good idea what it would mean to apply  as a duck-picture. It is not at all clear what it 
would be to apply the milk and coockies as encapsulating the taste of childhood. I suggest that this 
indicates a distinction between two kinds of aspect-perception: preparatory, and non-preparatory. I discuss 
this in “Reflecting on Language from ‘Sideways-on’: Preparatory and Non-Preparatory Aspects-Seeing,” 
Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy, forthcoming. 
 
27 A similar distinction is made, albeit implicitly, by Avner Baz: “what exactly is meant by ‘his sudden 
realization that the picture-object is both a picture-meek-man and a picture-complacent-businessman’[?] 
Does it mean that he suddenly realizes—it all of a sudden occurs to him—that it could serve as either of 
them, be taken or interpreted to be either of them? Or does it mean that he found he could see it as one or 
the other?” (LFW, 242). Unlike me, Baz does not connect the phenomena of aspects to a reflective attitude 
towards language, or to the idea that meaning in aspect-perception is detached from use. 
 
28 A note of warning: When we suddenly notice an aspect, we may sometimes express this by saying “I’ve 
just realized it is a duck!” That is, we may use the terms ‘realize’—and likewise ‘identify,’ and 
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‘recognize’—to express aspect experiences. What is important, however, is not what term we use, but our 
intention in using it: whether by using the term we intend to say that we are making a conceptual judgment, 
in which case we are not expressing an aspect-experience, or we intend that we have brought a concept to 
the object but have not thereby committed ourselves to treating the object as if it decisively fell under that 
concept, in which case we are expressing an aspect-experience. 
 
29 I’m borrowing this expression from John McDowell’s “Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following,” in 
Wittgenstein: To Follow A Rule, S. Holtzman & Christopher M. Leich (eds.), Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
141-62. I’m using it in a different way, however. McDowell uses it to refer to a standpoint independent of 
all human interests, activities, and reactions. Examining something in aspect-perception from a disengaged 
standpoint does not mean that we are detached from what Stanley Cavell called our “whirl of organism” 
(“The availability of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy,” Must We Mean What We Say? Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press; 1969, 44-72, 52). In aspect-perception we are not disengaged from our 
humanity and interests. On the contrary, occupying the disengaged standpoint when experiencing an aspect 
can only happen out of interest in making sense. Although aspect-perception does indeed induce a kind of 
transcendence of our practical linguistic life to a reflective and disengaged standpoint, and although this 
transcendence may be performed as a gesture of an attempted transcendence of humanity, it is never 
actually that. The very point of allowing ourselves to occupy that external standpoint is to give expression 
to our need to make sense of things: to own in thought the reality in which we live. The very point of 
allowing oneself to adopt that reflective external standpoint is out of concern for the norms one is 
disengaged from, and may express, for example, the wish to re-engage them, or to express frustration about 
them. It is itself an expression of humanity.  
 
30 Compare CV, 7.  
 
31 IO, 180.  
 
32 “The Touch of Words,” Seeing Wittgenstein Anew, Day W. and Krebs V. J. (eds.), Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010, 81-98, 82. Cavell discusses a case in which this perception (that 
rationality has come to express irrationality) is “tortured,” and words are “cursed.” Some but not all 
relevant cases are such. In Tractarian terms (TLP, §6.43), the realization that no words will capture our 
intention as a matter of course can be a mark of unhappiness, as well as of happiness. This means, for 
example, that the ability to see aspects allows for intimacy with others and with the world; but it also 
reveals the possibility of failure to achieve such intimacy—failure to make the world ours, and to share it 
with others. 
 
33 Stephen Mulhall argues that “[T]he fullness of our inheritance of the rules of grammar is a capacity to 
find the possibilities of meaning in the words they govern which are not themselves governable by (not 
simply projections, however unexpected, of) rules” (IO, 180). Compare Avner Baz’s claim that: “to see an 
aspect is to step beyond the guidance of grammar” (PSA, 120). 
 
34 Cora Diamond demonstrates a logical peculiarity inherent in a closely related issue: “the linguistic 
activity of talking about a secondary activity […] will involve the use of expressions in a secondary sense, 
or of expressions which can only be explained in terms of them” (“Secondary Sense,” The Realistic Spirit, 
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT, 1991, 225-41, 231-2). Similarly, for Stephen Mulhall, I take it, the 
“unprecedented number of newly minted terms that Wittgenstein introduces in the course of his reflections 
on aspect-dawning” (IO, 157) is meant to lead the reader to the recognition that the very description of the 
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phenomenon forces a shift of linguistic practices. Compare also Cora Diamond’s remarks on the kind of 
imaginative effort needed for the expression of “the Ethical” in the TLP, in “Ethics, Imagination and the 
Method of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus,” in: The New Wittgenstein, Crary, A. and Read R. (eds.) London: 
Routledge, 2000, pp. 149-173. 
 
35 “The Availability of Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy,” Must We Mean What We Say? Updated Edition, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 44-72, 1969, 72. Avner Baz uses this quotation as a motto for one 
of his papers on aspects.  
 
36 For their comments and suggestions, I thank Avner Baz, Mandel Cabrera, Alice Crary, Kelly Jolley, 
Oskari Kuusela, and Dafi Agam-Segal. 
